Ensuring Rural Infrastructure in India: Role of Rural Infrastructure Development fund by Rajeev, Meenakshi
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Ensuring Rural Infrastructure in India:
Role of Rural Infrastructure
Development fund
Meenakshi Rajeev
Institute for Social and Economic Change
10. January 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9836/
MPRA Paper No. 9836, posted 8. August 2008 00:45 UTC
 1
Ensuring Rural Infrastructure in India:  
Role of Rural Infrastructure Development fund  
By 
 
Meenakshi Rajeev1 
Institute for Social and Economic Change 
Bangalore-72 
 
Abstract 
Inclusive economic growth is the most talked about issue in India. This is due to the 
fact that the impacts of the recent spectacular growth have not been able to percolate 
down to    various segments of population, most importantly to the rural population. 
Rural infrastructure in India have still remained  far from satisfactory and amongst 
others, lack of funds is one critical reason for this. In order to ensure smooth flow of 
funds for the development of  infrastructure in rural India, rural infrastructure 
development fund (RIDF) was introduced in the budget of 1995-’96. The Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI) governs this fund through NABARD with corpus from the commercial 
banks. This paper is an attempt to critically examine some of  the issues that arise in 
the context of utilization of the fund by different states of India. The study finds that 
many projects remain incomplete even after receiving funds under RIDF and certain 
measures are necessary to ensure proper utilization of funds as well as to reduce intra 
rural disparity in India.   
 
JEL Classification: O22, G 18, H 53, H 54. 
1. Introduction 
For a balanced growth of any economy rural sector needs equal attention if not more than 
that of the urban counterpart. Needless to say, physical infrastructure plays critical role in 
growth and development. Good infrastructure is necessary not only for economic 
development of rural areas but also for overall human development and decent standard 
of living.  
In India, while the importance of rural infrastructure has been well recognized, adequate 
measures to improve the same are not forthcoming. Amongst many other constraints, the 
                                                 
1  This work was done as a part of a project at the ADRT Centre of the Institute. Author is grateful for the 
support. Many thanks to R S Deshapnde for  support and useful discussions.   
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poor financial health of the states is the major cause for the state of affairs we observe 
today. Not only are rural infrastructure development projects inadequate in number, many 
projects sanctioned and already started also remaining incomplete due to various reasons. 
Noting these problems, in the Union Budget Speech of 1995-96, the Hon'ble Finance 
Minister announced that- "Inadequacy of public investment in agriculture is today a 
matter of general concern. This is an area, which is the responsibility of States. But many 
States have neglected investment in infrastructure for agriculture. There are many rural 
infrastructure projects, which have been started but are lying incomplete for want of 
resources. They represent a major loss of potential income and employment to rural 
population." 
In an attempt to provide the necessary resources for rural infrastructure development, the 
possibility of creating a fund for this purpose was conceived at that time. With this in 
mind, during that period a corpus was created by the Reserve Bank of India in NABARD 
with contributions from  commercial banks. This fund, known as the rural infrastructure 
development fund (RIDF), was initially developed to provide resources for  projects that 
remained unfinished due to want of resources, but later extended to new projects as well. 
RIDF-I was launched in 1995–96 with an initial corpus of Rs.2000 crores through 
contributions both from public and private sector banks. The provision of this fund has 
indeed helped many states to develop rural infrastructure (Government of Andhra 
Pradesh, 2000, CII, 2005). Except for a brief period of break, this funding provision has 
been continuing till today.  After more than 10 years of its inception, it is useful to 
scrutinize the status of RIDF, its coverage and the extent to which it has helped the states 
in rural infrastructure development.  
In this background the present paper looks at the various aspects of RIDF and present a 
critical analysis of the utilization of funds. 
2. Salient Features of RIDF  
RIDF-I was launched in 1995-96 with an initial corpus of Rs.2000 crore through 
contributions both from public and private sector banks. It is noteworthy in this context 
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that previously both public and private banks often failed to meet  priority sector norms 
for lending (see RBI reports). After enlargement of the scope of the priority sector to a 
great extent, though banks have currently been meeting the overall norms of priority 
sector lending, they still fail to meet the target for agricultural lending. Given this 
background, contributions to NABARD by the banks under the provision of RIDF is 
considered  agricultural lending by the banks. Later, since 1996-97 i.e., from the start of 
RIDF-II, deposits from commercial banks in the RIDF have been made broad-based by 
including shortfalls either in direct finance to agriculture and/or shortfall in priority sector 
lending. The scheme has been continued thereafter and currently RIDF-XI is in operation. 
The tranche-wise2 size of the corpus shows positive growth all through, depicting steady 
growth of funds under RIDF; though as expected, in real terms, growth rates are not as 
striking as that of their nominal counterparts (Table 1). 
 Table 1 Tranche-wise size of corpus, RIDF (in Rs. Crore) 
RIDF 
tranche/ 
year 
Corpus in 
nominal terms 
Percentage 
increment 
of the 
nominal 
corpus 
Corpus in 
real terms* 
Percent increment in 
real corpus 
RIDF I 
1995-96 
2000 
 1676.446 
 
RIDF II 
1996-97 
2500 
25 1950.078 
16 
RIDF III 
1997-98 
2500 
00 1828.822 
-6 
RIDF IV 
1998-99 
3000 
20 2032.52 
11 
RIDF V 
1999-
2000 
3500 
17 2281.617 
12 
RIDF VI 
2000-01 
4500 
29 2812.5 
23 
RIDF VII 5000 
11 3021.148 
7 
                                                 
2 A terminology used by NABARD. Here it essentially means year-wise. 
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2001-02     
RIDF 
VIII 
2002-03 
5500 
10 3248.671 
7 
RIDF IX 
2003-04 
5500 
00 3107.345 
-4 
RIDF X 
  
2004-05 
8000 
45 4444.444 
43 
RIDF XI 
2005-06 
8000 
0  
43 
RIDF XII 
2006-07 
10000 
  
 
* Deflated using GDP deflator 
Source: Compiled using NABARD data 
In fact in two of the tranches viz., III and IX , growth rates are indeed found to be 
negative. 
 Once the total RIDF fund for a year is decided by the Central Government, states are 
requested to submit project proposals. State governments in turn request the relevant 
departments to come up with proposals. The cabinet sub-committees of the respective 
states later scrutinize these proposals and, considering among other things the financial 
strength of the government, fix project limits for each department. The departments in 
turn revise their proposals, which are then sent to the regional offices (RO) of NABARD. 
RBI Deputy Governor and a nominee from RBI are members amongst others in the 
project sanction committee, which meet about 7 to 8 times in a year (NABARD Annual 
Report). 
Though to begin with only state governments could borrow under this fund,  since 1999, 
the set  of  borrowing institutions has been enlarged. In particular, it has been decided to 
extend loans to Panchayat Raj institutions (PRIs), Non-Governmental organisations, Self-
Help groups etc. w.e.f. 1 April 1999. This is done possibly under the assumption  that 
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local governments would know the local needs better and, being stake holders, would 
implement the projects more efficiently. The respective state governments, however, 
remain the guarantors of such loans. The repayment period for the loans under RIDF was 
of 5 years that included a 2-year grace period; this was provided under RIDF-I to RIDF-
V. The repayment period has, however, been extended later to 7 years, including a grace 
period of 2 years, from RIDF-VI onwards. 
Once a particular project is cleared , loans are released on installments usually on a 
reimbursement basis by the Regional Offices of NABARD. However, in order to 
facilitate the states to carry out the projects smoothly , the provision of releasing advance 
was introduced from RIDF X onwards.  The Finance Department of each state is 
nominated by state governments to act as the nodal department to operationalise RIDF. 
All project proposals are therefore routed only through the Finance Department. 
As far as lending institutions are concerned, all scheduled commercial banks and  
regional rural banks are the main lenders. These banks keep their shortfalls in priority 
sector lending with NABARD for this purpose, from which NABARD in turn refinances 
these projects.  
The funds thus supplied by the banks and demanded by the state governments can be 
used for designated purposes only. In the beginning, only ongoing irrigation, flood 
protection, and watershed management projects were financed under RIDF-I as a 'last 
mile approach' to facilitate completion of  projects delayed on account of financial 
constraints. The financing of rural road & bridge projects was started during RIDF-II. 
Subsequently, coverage of RIDF was enhanced in each tranche and at present, a wide 
range of activities such as primary schools, primary health centres, village haats, joint 
forest management, terminal and rural markets, rain water harvesting, fish jetties, mini 
hydel and system improvement projects in the power sector, rural drinking water supply 
schemes, citizen information centres, anganwadi centres and shishu shiksha kendras are 
also being brought under RIDF.  Though over time a large number of areas have been 
incorporated under RIDF, roads and bridges remained the major infrastructures  funded 
under RIDF.  
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While allocating funds to the states even for the designated purposes certain norms are 
usually followed. Currently, the allocation norms provide weightage  to rural population 
and no proposal is accepted directly from any other department of a state government. 
Documentation and release of loans etc. are also executed only by them. 
3. Rate of Interest on RIDF Loan 
Loans under RIDF-I were advanced to state governments at an interest rate of 13%. The 
rate of interest on loans under RIDF-II and III was reduced to 12%. The rate of interest 
under tranches IV to VII was further brought down to 7% w.e.f. 1 November 2003 and 
thereafter the rate of interests under RIDF VIII and IX are linked to bank rate, which  at 
present is  about 6%. To begin with the following procedure was adopted to generate 
funds. Banks kept their deficiency to priority sector lending with NABARD and the latter 
in turn chanelised these resources to the state governments through RIDF. NABARD 
pays interest to the banks for their deposits which in turn it recovers from the state 
governments. However, it so happened that NABARD was unable to deploy the funds as 
the state governments were unable create sufficient demand for the funds available3. 
Since the suppliers found the loan risk free and the supply was more than the demand a 
disequlibrium prevailed which NABARD did not rejoice as it had to pay interests to the 
banks.  
Under such circumstances with a view to encouraging commercial banks to enhance flow 
of direct credit to agriculture, it was decided by RBI to link interest on bank contribution 
to RIDF, from Tranche-VII, to the extent of the shortfall of their agriculture lending vis-
a-vis the targets. The inversely proportional rates of interest paid to commercial banks are 
as in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
3 As revealed during  discussions with  RBI officials. 
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           Table 2  Interest rate structure of RIDF 
Shortfall in lending to 
agriculture as percentage to 
net bank credit 
Current rates (%) for RIDF VIII & XI  
Less than 2% points 6 (prevailing Bank Rate(BR)) 
2 % to 4.99% points 5 (prevailing BR minus 1%) 
5% to 8.99% points 4 (prevailing BR minus 2%) 
Above 9% points 3 (prevailing BR minus 3%) 
            Source : NABARD 
As per the guidelines of RBI/GOI, NABARD retains a margin of 0.5% for administering 
RIDF. The differential interest, however, is credited to the Watershed Development Fund 
maintained by NABARD.  
Given these set of norms formulated by RBI, it is of interest to examine the actual 
utilization of the funds. Amongst other criteria, actual sanction of funds depends on the 
demand for loans  under the RIDF scheme placed by a state. Though there has been some 
increment in sanction of funds after the first tranche , sanction figures remained more or 
less stagnant thereafter for the following three years. 
 
4. Utilization of funds 
Sanctions and Disbursements 
A closer observation of the sanction of loans reveals that from the year 1999-2000 we 
observe a steady increase followed by a fall in 2003-04 and a sharp increase during the  
year 2004-05 (Fig. 1) . Since contributions to the ‘fund’ are considered  priority sector 
lending for  banks, which also provides them with risk-free returns, supply of funds does 
not appear to pose any constraint. Rather, it is possibly the demand for funds that lie on 
the short side of the market.  
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Fig 1 Sanctions and Disbursements of RIDF over the years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled using NABARD data 
In fact, conversion of nominal sanction figures (Fig 1) to real terms4 (Fig 2) clearly shows 
negative growth rates over a number of years. 
Fig.2 Sanction of RIDF (in real terms) 
 
 
 
 
km 
Source: Compiled using NABARD data 
                                                 
4 Deflated by GDP deflator. 
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Disbursement of funds sanctioned to a project under RIDF is not automatic and paid all at 
once. Payment by NABARD depends crucially on the progress of the project and 
utilization of funds. In fact, as mentioned above, states need to first incur expenditure and 
then get it reimbursed under RIDF. Statistics involving disbursement show that funds 
sanctioned even ten years earlier have not been fully disbursed yet. This further indicates 
that states may have problems in making funds available for rural infrastructure. This 
becomes even more clear when we look at the status of projects.  
 
Status of RIDF Projects 
Norms of loans under RIDF as delineated above show that the normal phasing was 2 
years for RIDF-I which was extended later to 3 years for  subsequent tranches. However, 
due to operational constraints, phasing has to be normally extended for the tranche as a 
whole or for specific projects to enable state governments to complete the projects.  
If we now examine the status of the projects (Table 3), it is observed that even after 10 
years some projects  have remained incomplete. About 6000 projects taken up from RIDF 
I to V have remained incomplete till date. One may recall in this context that the main 
idea behind introduction of RIDF is to enable the state governments to complete hitherto 
incomplete projects which remained so due to lack of funds. However, if projects taken 
up under RIDF itself remain incomplete, may be due to a state’s inability to borrow funds 
under the given terms and conditions, then the whole purpose of introduction of such a 
scheme becomes meaningless.    
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Table 3 Number of incomplete projects 
RIDF I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X Total 
No of 
incomplete 
Projects 
234 600 366 1004 3666 6261 16049 14118 19091 60015 121404
Source: NABARD 
Purpose-wise Sanction of loans 
We may recall that RIDF I was devoted entirely to irrigation projects and thereafter roads 
and bridges were taken up for funding; since then across states there has been higher 
emphasis on the use of funds for road development rather than for irrigation. Over time it 
has been observed that about 37% of the funds go for road development and 34% for 
irrigation (Table 4). In  subsequent tranches, several other infrastructure facilities have 
been made eligible for funding under RIDF. RIDF X further enlarged this list and 
introduced a whole host of services to be funded under RIDF.  
Table 4 Share of different sectors in total loans under first eight tranches (till March 2003) 
Sector Amount (Rs. crore) % of total 
Roads 10898.27 37 
Irrigation 10105.84 34.3 
Bridges 3656.57 12.4 
Watershed 508.61 1.7 
Power sector 1053.34 3.6 
Rural drinking water 1147.89 3.9 
Others 2104.78 7.1 
Total 29475.3 100 
Source: Compiled using NABARD data 
Sanction of Funds to Local Level Institutions 
It was decided in 1999 that RIDF can be given to  local level institutions like the 
Panchayati Raj Institution (PRI) or prominent self help groups (SHG) of the locality. The 
respective state government remains the guarantor of the loan taken. One of the main 
objectives of making funds available to  local level institutions is to ensure efficient 
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utilization of funds. Since local governments themselves are stakeholders one may expect 
funds to be employed according to the local needs. During the first year one observes as 
high as 17% of funds diverted to the local level institutions. However, over time this 
share shows considerable decline, even in absolute levels (Table 5). From about 500 
crores in 2001-02, funds diverted to PRIs declined to about 50 crores in the next two 
years.  
Table 5 Sanction of funds to local level institutions 
Year 
Sanction 
in Rs 
crores 
Out of which, 
sanction for 
PRI/SHG/NGO
Percentage 
share of 
PRI/SHG/NGO
1999-00 3504.41 608.53 17 
2000-01 4539.05 736.11 16 
2001-02 4792.52 567.7 12 
2002-03 6039.62 533.22 9 
2003-04 5599 43.2 0.7 
2004-05 8282.75 54.28 0.7 
Total 42948.51 2543.04 6 
Source: Computed using NABARD data 
It has been observed by a number of authors that state level functionaries are often 
hesitant to hand over the financial and functional powers to local governments (Mathur, 
2003). In case of RIDF also we observe a similar tendency. 
5. Allocation of funds and availability of infrastructure 
Strong positive correlation between 
rural poverty and deficiency of 
infrastructure is a well-established 
phenomenon. For example, a recent 
report from NCAER titled “India 
Rural Infrastructure Report” shows 
that with different infrastructure 
deficiency indices, rural poverty is 
Table 6 Correlation of rural poverty with 
different infrastructure deficiency indices 
Deprivation 
indices 
Correlation 
Roads 0.615 
Telecom 0.655 
Power 0.925 
Overall 0.832 
Source: Rural Infrastructure Report, 2006, 
NCAER
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positively correlated (Table 6).  
In other words, the higher the deficiency of infrastructure, the higher  is the poverty rate 
and vice versa. Rajaraman (2003) in this context remarks that there are established 
empirical evidences on the positive growth and poverty eradication outcomes of 
investment in rural infrastructure, and on higher incremental returns to infrastructure 
provision in relatively poorly endowed regions. These findings holds good not only in 
case of India but also for other developing nations as well (Binswanger et al, 1989, 
Ahmed and Hossain, 1990, Fan et al, 2000, Fan and Hazell, 2001).  Thus one can argue 
that poverty rate gives an indication of the extent of  the need for infrastructure. 
Infrastructure like irrigation facilities or rural roads can reduce overall cost of irrigation 
and by enhancing connectivity can offer better marketing possibilities. This can check 
further deterioration in the economic status of the poor. If we accept this line of 
argument, we can then examine whether  regions with higher levels of rural poverty get 
better allocation of funds for infrastructure development.  
Rural Poverty 
 
Rural poverty rates for different states of India show considerable disparities (see Table 
A.1 in Appendix).  
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As discussed above, if we assume that poverty and lack of good infrastructure are 
positively related then we can consider these rates as  indirect indicators of the adequacy 
of  rural infrastructure or, conversely,  improvement of infrastructure in comparatively 
poorer regions can help in reduction of rural poverty and income inequality across rural 
regions. Furthermore, at the time of inception of RIDF, the remark made by the then 
Finance Minister indicates that ‘to be able to increase the income of the rural poor’ was 
one of the prime motives for introducing RIDF. In this background, we should expect the 
poorer regions to receive higher allocations of funds. In this background it is essential to 
ask whether the  states with higher poverty rates use more funds for rural development 
under RIDF?  
 
 Relation between Rural Poverty Rates and Flow of Funds   
 
We have considered the states in terms of RIDF loans sanctioned per hectare of rural 
area5 and rural poverty rates. Out of a total of 28 states, the top 14 are placed in the 
category ‘high’ (H) and the bottom 14 are in the category ‘low’ (L). Comparison of the 
poverty rates and flow of funds across states reveals the following.  
                                                 
5 ‘Rural population’ can also be used as a normalizing factor , and has been used in this report. However, 
‘rural area’ appears to be a more appropriate factor for normalization given the kind of infrastructure 
services involved.  This has also been done in Rajaraman (2003).  
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Table 7 Classification of states with respect to poverty rates and total loan flow per 
hectare 
             Rural poverty rate  
 L H 
L J & K 
Rajasthan 
MP 
Manipur 
Meghalaya 
Mizoram 
Nagaland 
Sikkim 
Tripura 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Jharkhand 
H Goa, Punjab 
Himachal 
Haryana 
 Pradesh 
Kerala 
AP 
Gujarat 
Karnataka 
Maharastra 
TN 
UP 
WB 
Orissa 
Tripura 
 
Source : Compiled using NABARD data and Jha ( 2002) 
 
Concentration of states around the off-diagonal in Table 7 clearly reveals that the states with 
lower poverty rates are also those which made  higher demands for resources under RIDF. On the 
contrary, states with higher rural poverty rates  are minimal users of RIDF for rural infrastructure 
developments.  
 
In fact, if we look at the correlation between the total flow of RIDF funds (per rural area) 
and rural poverty rates, we observe a  significant negative correlation (-0.365, significant 
at 6% level). In other words, the higher the rates of rural poverty (indicating greater need 
 
 
Loan/rural area 
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for infrastructure) the lower are the flow of funds. Since RIDF is a demand driven 
scheme, this may be due to the fact that the poorer states have lesser ability to borrow and 
thus though there is need, this desire is not backed by adequate purchasing power and, 
hence, requirements have not transformed into demand6.  
 
After looking at this general indicator and its relation with the total flow of funds we next 
move on to the sector specific allocations. 
 
5.1 Funding for Rural Roads  
Creation of irrigation facilities and construction rural roads for better connectivity are two major 
activities taken up through RIDF. The first RIDF  concentrated mainly on providing minor 
irrigation facilities. Thereafter rural roads and bridges are incorporated under the purview of 
RIDF which now constitutes the highest share in flow of funds across sectors. However, as 
expected, flow of funds and hence creation of road potential through RIDF  is not uniform across 
regions. Comparatively Tamilnadu and Karnataka have created maximum road facilities through 
RIDF and some of the other similarly placed   states are Maharastra, Kerala, Goa  and Punjab.  
 
                                                 
6 Even if we normalized the loan figures by rural area or rural population, negative relation prevails even   
   though level of significance declines. 
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Fig.3 Top 10 states in terms of road potential created under RIDF I to X  per hectare of 
rural area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled using NABARD data 
 
 
If we look at the percentage of villages connected by roads (see Table A.2, in the Appendix) as of 
1996-97 (beginning of RIDF) we observe that Goa, Karnataka, Tamilnadu, Punjab, Haryana, 
Gujrat and Andhra Pradesh were some of the well-connected states. On the other hand, Madhya 
Pradesh, Bihar and even West Bangal had less than 50% villages connected. As argued above, 
while demand for rural roads is difficult to estimate, adequacy of the same may be proxied  by the 
percentages villages yet to be connected by roads. Comparatively speaking one would expect 
more funds to flow to the states where even 50 % of the villages are not connected by roads. 
Though the quality/ conditions of the roads may not be satisfactory even in the highly connected 
states,  the situation is expected to be even worse for the poorly connected ones.  
 
After examining these numbers the next question that arises is, “Is the in flow of funds 
greater towards   states with relatively inadequate connectivity?” We classify below the 
states according on the basis of percentage of villages yet to be connected by roads. The 
top 50% of the states are considered to be well connected in relative terms. Similarly road 
potential created through RIDF loans from I to IX are considered per hectare of rural area 
for cross tabulation purposes (Table 8).  
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Table 8 Classification of states with respect to road potential created per hectare of rural 
area and rural connectivity (percentage of villages connected by roads, 1996-97) 
 
            Rural connectivity  
 L H 
L MP 
Arunachal P 
Meghalaya 
Manipur 
Bihar 
Orissa 
Tripura 
 
J & K 
Mizoram 
Haryana 
H HP 
Assam 
WB 
UP 
Tamilnadu 
Rajasthan 
Maharastra 
AP 
Nagaland 
Gujarat 
Punjab 
Kerala 
Karnataka 
Goa 
 
Calculation of correlation between the inadequacy indices and potential of roads created 
through RIDF funds show  that correlation has negative sign (-0.234, however the 
coefficient is insignificant) . 
 
 
5.2 Irrigation Facilities 
 
Next to roads and bridges, another major sector funded by RIDF is minor irrigation. If we 
look at the state-wise irrigation potential created through RIDF projects per hectare of net 
sown area we observe  Haryana is the major benefactor, followed by West Bengal and 
UP (Fig. 4). 
 
Fig 4 Irrigation potential created/ NSA through RIDF I to IX 
Road 
potential 
created/rural 
area 
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Source: Compiled using NABARD data 
 
Percentage of net irrigated area to NSA provides indicator of adequacy of irrigation 
facilities in a state7. The lower the percentage of irrigated area, the more inadequate is the 
region  in terms of this infrastructure. Taking this indicator into consideration, we have 
classified the top 50% of the states as those with the high adequacy and the bottom 50% 
as those with low adequacy.  
 
Table 9 Classification of states with respect to irrigation potential created per hectare of 
net sown area and percentage of gross area irrigated8 (average of percentages taken over 
the period of RIDF) 
 
                           Gross area irrigated/GSA  
 L H 
L Arunachal Tamil nadu 
                                                 
7 Calculations have also been done using gross cropped area and we arrive at qualitatively similar results. 
8 Gross area irrigated figures are average over the period of RIDF and are taken from www.indiastat.com 
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Meghalaya 
Sikkim 
Karnataka 
Mizoram 
Maharastra 
MP 
Rajasthan 
Gujarat 
Bihar 
Nagaland 
H Kerala 
Assam 
Tripura 
Himachal P 
Goa 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Manipur 
AP 
J & K 
UP 
WB 
Haryana 
 
 
 
Classification of states again shows concentration around the diagonal (Table 9). Thus  
states with inadequate infrastructure also have lower allocation of resources and thereby 
lower levels of creation of infrastructure facility. Computation of correlation also shows 
significant positive values (0.48). Thus states with higher proportions of irrigated area 
also had higher allocations of funds under RIDF for the same. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The concept of RIDF has been developed to enable  states to obtain funds for rural 
infrastructure development and side by side to help commercial banks to meet priority 
sector lending norms. It is interesting to note however that presently, with the flexible 
interest rate regime, banks are ready to lend to the state at a lower interest rate than that 
of NABARD9. Furthermore a bank’s direct loan to a state government is not on 
reimbursement basis. Thus,  a state government has  incentive to borrow directly from a 
commercial bank for the same infrastructure development project, than going through 
NABARD. However, for the bank, as the loan is not routed through NABARD, will not 
be considered  priority sector lending.  
                                                 
9 As revealed during our discussions with the government officials. 
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Secondly, special attention should be given to reduce the number of incomplete projects 
under RIDF. Since loans are disbursed on reimbursement basis, due to lack of funds, 
projects often get delayed and cost escalation occurs. Unless there is further support for 
meeting the increased cost, projects may remain incomplete. This is one of the major 
problems with RIDF, as stated by one of the government officials in Karnataka involved 
with RIDF projects. Preference is therefore given to improve rural infrastructure through 
central government schemes like Prime Minister’s Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY). 
Unless the problem of completion of projects in time is tackled by both the borrower and 
the lender through a combined effort, rural infrastructure development will suffer.  
Involving the other stakeholders like residents and local self-governments in project 
formulation and implementation is also quite essential. Only then can the limited 
resources  be utilized in a most optimal manner. 
While resources from RIDF have been flowing to all states of India for rural 
infrastructure development, they do not follow any systematic pattern over time. From 
the study of growth rates of loans, it appears that loans are taken more on an ad hoc basis 
rather than on that of a well-prepared planned development. Further, more funds are  
allocated to  regions that are comparatively better off in terms of various indicators 
considered, in particular, per capita income, rural poverty or physical infrastructure.  
These funds would  be successful in reducing  intra-rural disparity only if they are 
directed more in a need based manner. Both state governments and NABARD should 
work jointly towards it.  
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    Appendix  
 
Table A.1 Rural Poverty Rates (percent), 30 days recall, 1999-2000 
Goa  1.35 West Bengal  31.85
Jammu & Kashmir  3.97 Madhya Pradesh  37.06
Punjab  6.35 Manipur  40.04
Himachal Pradesh  7.94 Meghalaya  40.04
Haryana  8.27 Mizoram  40.04
Kerala  9.38 Nagaland 5 40.04
Andhra Pradesh  11.05 Sikkim  40.04
Gujarat  13.17 Tripura  40.04
Rajasthan 13.74 Arunachal Pradesh  40.4
Karnataka  17.38 Assam  40.4
Tamil Nadu  20.55 Bihar  44.3
Maharashtra  23.72 Jharkhand 44.3
Uttar Pradesh  31.22 Orissa  48.01
Source: Jha ( 2002) 
Table A.2  Percentage of villages yet to be connected by roads, 1996-97 
Madhya Pradesh* 71.61 Maharashtra 29.23
Arunachal Pradesh 59.44 Assam 25.44
Himachal Pradesh 55.13 Sikkim 20.53
 Meghalaya 54.67 Mizoram 16.69
Manipur 54.04 Andhra 14.12
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Pradesh 
Bihar* 52.16 Nagaland 11.17
West Bengal 51.33 Gujarat 5.67
Orissa 50.86 Punjab 2.73
Uttar Pradesh* 49.59 Haryana 1.2
Tripura 49.07 Kerala 0.75
Tamil Nadu 48.82 Karnataka 0.38
Rajasthan 47.97 Goa 0.27
Jammu & Kashmir 34.19 
                       * Erstwhile, now two states. 
                        Source: Economic Intelligence Services, CMIE, 1997. 
Table A3.1 Agricultural and Priority Sector Credit disbursed by commercial banks : All India 
Year Agricultural credit as 
percentage of total credit 
Priority sector credit as % 
of total credit 
1995 14.1 36.8 
1996 14.3 37.8 
1997 16.3 41.7 
1998 15.7 41.8 
1999 16.3 43.5 
2002 15.3 43.5 
2003 10.8  
Source : R B I 
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